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Abstract 
 
Popular multiverse models such as the one based on the string 
theory landscape require an underlying set of unexplained laws 
containing many specific features and highly restrictive 
prerequisites. I explore the consequences of relaxing some of these 
prerequisites with a view to discovering whether any of them 
might be justified anthropically. Examples considered include 
integer space dimensionality, the immutable, Platonic nature of the 
laws of physics and the no-go theorem for strong emergence. The 
problem of why some physical laws exist, but others which are 
seemingly possible do not, takes on a new complexion following 
this analysis, although it remains an unsolved problem in the 
absence of an additional criterion. 
 
1. Background 
 
The puzzle of why the universe consists of the things it does is one of the oldest 
problems of philosophy. Given the seemingly limitless possibilities available, why is it 
the case that atoms, stars, clouds, crystals, etc. are “chosen” to exist in profusion in 
preference to, say, pulsating green jelly or pentagonal chain mail? A related question is 
why the entities that do exist conform to the particular physical laws that they do as 
opposed to any other set of laws one might care to imagine. Physicists have mostly 
ignored this problem, content to accept the observed physical systems and their specific 
laws as “given,” and preferring to concentrate on the job of elucidating them. Notable 
exceptions were Einstein, who famously remarked that he wanted to know whether “God 
had any choice” in the nature of his creation, and Wheeler, whose rhetorical question 
“How come existence?” provided the basis for a series of speculative papers (Wheeler, 
1979, 1983, 1988, 1989, 1993). 
Recently, however, theoretical physicists and cosmologists have been giving increasing 
attention to the problem of “what exists”. In part this stems from the growing interest in 
unification, especially string/M theory, and the concomitant sharp disagreements about 
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 uniqueness (see, for example, Danielsson, 2001). Meanwhile, the popularity of multiverse 
cosmological models has prompted a dramatic reappraisal of the very concept physical 
existence. 
The issues are clarified in Fig. 1. The picture shows three sets separated by two 
boundaries, A and B. The middle region is the set of all things that observers can in 
principle observe. (At the moment, of course, humans have actually observed only a 
fraction of what is “out there”.) The set delineated by A can be a subset of all that exists. 
Then there is a bigger set, containing the other two: the set of all that can exist. The 
principal question I shall address in this paper is how one might determine the location of 
the boundaries A and B. 
A common claim among string/M theorists is that A coincides with B; that is, the set of 
all that can be observed is the same as the set of all that exists (Danielsson, 2001). (By 
this, I refer to all fundamental entities and laws that can in principle be observed. I am 
excluding unique or unusual macroscopic objects that might be unobservable because 
they form beyond an event or particle horizon, for example.) This claim derives from the 
hope that the final unified theory will be in some sense unique, so that it describes a 
single possible world consistent with the known facts. A very different claim is made, 
however, by another group of theoretical physicists and cosmologists, who postulate a 
multiverse of different universes, and invoke an observer selection effect to define 
boundary A. For example, in the string theory landscape model of Susskind (2005), there 
are > 10500 possible vacuum states of the theory, each with distinct low-energy physics. 
When the landscape concept is combined with eternal inflation (see for example Linde, 
1990), there is a mechanism to populate the landscape with actual universes. The vast 
majority of these universes would be inconsistent with the emergence of life and 
observers, and so would go unseen. In that case, “what is observed” is a minute subset of 
all that exists, and boundary A is defined by the criteria necessary for the emergence of 
life and observers (Barrow and Tipler, 1986). We don’t have a very clear idea of what 
those criteria are (the existence of carbon, water and stable stars are often cited); 
however, this is a purely scientific matter that could one day be settled. 
It is not my intention to review the arguments for and against the competing positions 
in regard to boundary A, since they have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (see, for 
example, Susskind 2005). Rather I wish to focus the discussion on boundary B, and 
specifically on three attempts to explain it (or explain it away). Boundary B, remember, 
separates that which exists from that which is possible but in fact non-existent. 
 
1. Unique universe 
 
The claim is sometimes made that boundary B does not exist, that is, the set of all that 
exists is the set of all that can exist. Expressed differently, this claim says that the 
universe must exist necessarily as it is or, to paraphrase Einstein, that “God had no 
choice” in its nature because there is only one possible world. The justification for this 
viewpoint rests on a belief that a truly unified theory of physics would have no free 
parameters, and its mathematical form would be so tightly constrained by logical self-
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 consistently that it would be unique, and possess a unique “solution” representing the 
physical state of the universe. (There may of course be flexibility within this unique state 
on account of quantum indeterminism.) 
It is easy to demonstrate that the foregoing claim is false in the form stated. A 
traditional practice among theoretical physicists is to construct self-consistent 
mathematical models that are simpler than the real universe. For example, the Thirring 
model in quantum field theory, mini-superspace models of quantum gravity, Boltzmann 
gases. These models offer impoverished descriptions of reality, and are studied because 
they capture in some useful way a restricted feature of nature. Although they are not 
serious contenders for descriptions of the real world, nevertheless they describe possible 
worlds. And it is hard to see any limit on the number of different artificial mathematical 
models of this sort. So the universe quite clearly could have been otherwise in a 
seemingly limitless number of ways. 
It might be possible to establish a weaker claim: that there is a unique universe 
consistent with all current observations. The additional criterion seems to be implicit in 
discussions of uniqueness in final theories, although the restriction is often quietly 
dropped when applying it to the problem of boundary B. Other possible additional criteria 
come to mind. It could be that the observed universe is the uniquely simplest universe 
that is nevertheless rich enough to permit the existence of life. In that case boundaries A 
and B coincide, but it remains the case that the common boundary delineates only a small 
subset of all that can exist. 
 
2. The best of all possible worlds 
 
Leibniz (1697) was among the first to recognize that the world could have been 
otherwise, that the arrangement of matter in time and space could have varied in an 
endless number of ways. He even considered the possibility of a multiverse containing 
other regions of space and time, although he subsumed them all under his definition of 
“World.” Famously, Leibniz claimed that ours is the best of all possible Worlds. So 
Leibniz recognized the existence of boundary B (as far as I know he made no attempt to 
discuss boundary A), and he defined it in terms of some form of optimization criterion. 
Leibniz did not mean that our universe possesses maximum happiness or maximum 
goodness among its inhabitants (as Voltaire portrayed in his cynical lampooning). Rather, 
he had in mind a mathematical criterion of “best”: 
“God has chosen the most perfect World, that is, the one which is at the same time the 
simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena, as might be a line in geometry 
whose construction is easy and whose properties and effects are extremely remarkable 
and widespread.” 
Although Leibniz did not attempt to write down a mathematical quantity that might be 
optimized by the observed universe, it is not hard to think of candidates that could be 
tested. For example, one might appeal to algorithmic information theory to describe 
economy of hypotheses and to complexity theory to describe the richness of physical 
states. It remains an interesting challenge to mathematical physics whether the laws and 
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 initial conditions of the observed universe might in fact maximize a quantity of the form 
that Leibniz had in mind. 
 
3. Multiverse 
 
 
On general grounds we expect our universe to be part of a multiverse, if one proceeds 
from the default assumption that the universe originated in a physical process. To be sure, 
this process remains mysterious. Nevertheless, if it is a law-like physical process then, by 
definition of law, it can happen more than once. Logically, that does not compel there to 
be more than one universe. For example, I believe that the origin of Paul Davies was a 
law-like physical process, but I also believe that, in a sufficiently bounded universe, Paul 
Davies would be unique. So a law-like process might happen only once, if there are 
bounds. As we know of no bounds in the realm of multiverse cosmology, it seems 
reasonable to contemplate a multiplicity of big bangs spawning a multiplicity of 
universes. Eternal inflation provides a concrete model for such a multiverse. By 
combining eternal inflation with string/M theory, or any system involving symmetry 
breaking via a random process, we are led naturally to an ensemble of alternative 
universes with differing low-energy physics. 
Multiverse models are arguably successful in determining boundary A, but the problem 
of boundary B remains. Although a multiverse contains a (possibly infinite) variety of 
universes, the multiverse model will generally not exhaust the set of all possible 
universes. This is easy to see. For example, in the case of the string theory landscape 
combined with eternal inflation, the following assumptions are made: 
A. The universes are described by quantum mechanics. 
B. Space has an integer number of dimensions. There is one dimension of time. 
C. Spacetime has a causal structure described by pseudo-Riemannian geometry. 
D. There exists a universe-generating mechanism subject to some form of transcendent 
physical law. 
E. Physics involves an optimization principle (e.g. an action principle) leading to well-
defined laws, at least at relatively low energy. 
 
In addition to these prerequisites drawn from physics, there are certain more basic 
assumptions: 
F. The multiverse and its constituent universes are described by mathematics. 
G. The mathematical operations involve computable functions and standard logic. 
H. There are well-defined “states of the world” that have properties which may be 
specified mathematically. 
I. The basic physical laws, and the underlying principle/s from which they derive, are 
independent of the states. 
J. At least one universe contains observers, whose observations include sets of rational 
numbers that are related to the (more general) mathematical objects describing the 
universe by a specific and restricted projection rule, which is also mathematical. 
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 K. There is a meaningful distinction between “real” and “virtual,” or simulated, 
universes. 
 
Any or all of these restrictions might be relaxed, and we would still be dealing with 
possible universes. Therefore, the string theory landscape version of the multiverse 
represents only one among many possible multiverse models, and hence the members of 
the landscape multiverse – the 10500 or more distinct sorts of universes – legion though 
they may be, are nevertheless merely an infinitesimal restricted fraction of the totality of 
possible universes. So boundary B remains. 
A bold attempt to eliminate boundary B has been made by Tegmark (2003, 2005), who 
proposes that all possible universes that can exist, do exist. That includes universes with 
bizarre mathematical properties, such as fractal dimensions or non-Haussdorf spacetimes. 
Tegmark argues that the whole can be simpler than any of its parts, so that the set of all 
possible mathematical systems instantiated as universes might be preferable, on the 
grounds of Occam’s razor, to any of its subsets (other than perhaps the empty set, which 
we can rule out by observation). Tegmark also claims that the vast majority of universes 
in this mathematically extended set are inconsistent with life and observers. If so, the 
obvious question then arises of whether one may find constraints among the members of 
this larger multiverse by appeal to observer selection. That is, might some of the assumed 
properties of the universe listed above (A – K), which are taken almost completely for 
granted by most physicists, be given an anthropic explanation rather than simply be 
assumed a priori? 
Consider, for example, assumption A. The role of quantum mechanics is central to 
almost all multiverse models. But there is no fundamental reason why quantum 
mechanics has to apply to all possible universes. Standard quantum mechanics supplies a 
calculus for projecting from a Hilbert space defined over the complex field to the set of 
rational numbers representing real measurements. But there is no deeper-level law to say 
this is the way it has to happen. One could, for example, consider alternative projection 
rules. In addition, one can consider describing states in a space defined over different 
fields, such as the reals (Stueckelberg, 1960) or the quaternions (Adler, 1995) rather than 
the complex numbers. These alternative schemes possess distinctly different properties. 
For example, if entanglement is defined in terms of rebits rather than qubits, then states 
that are separable in the former case may not be separable in the latter (Caves, et. al., 
2001). This raises the interesting question of whether there is something anthropically 
special about Hilbert spaces over the complex field, i.e. quantum mechanics as we know 
it. Quantum mechanics is normally considered peripheral to biology, but I suspect this is 
too hasty. I have suggested some lines of evidence that the emergence of life might 
depend critically on quantum mechanics (Davies, 2005), and that its efficient function 
may also exploit quantum effects (Davies 2004a). If that were right, quantum mechanics 
might not after all be isolated in the space of dynamical schemes, but might be 
anthropically selected. 
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 2. Anthropic selection of space dimensionality 
 
An early application of anthropic reasoning was to the problem of why space possesses 
three dimensions (Whitrow, 1955). Anthropic constraints of space dimensionality remain 
a significant feature of multiverse models based on higher-dimensional physical theories, 
such as string theory, M theory and Kaluza-Klein models generally. However, in all these 
considerations it is tacitly assumed that the dimensionality of space is a positive integer 
(assumption B in my list). But one can entertain a broader class of universes in which the 
dimensionality of space n is extended to the positive reals and even into the complex 
plane, and then ask whether anthropic selection might constrain the dimensionality of 
space to a narrow window around n = 3. 
It is straightforward to generalize some physical theories to n space dimensions, e.g. 
the inverse square law of gravitation can be generalized to an inverse n – 1 law, with dire 
consequences for orbital stability if n ≠ 3 (Whitrow, 1955). Unfortunately, we have little 
idea in general what the laws of physics might be in, say, 3.657898 space dimensions, 
which makes the analysis of anthropic selection in non-integer dimensional spaces 
problematic. There is one exception, however – vacuum energy, which possesses an 
obvious and natural generalization beyond n = 3. In fact, analytic continuation of space 
dimensionality has long been used as a formal regularization procedure in quantum field 
theory to manage vacuum energy: quantities that diverge for integer n can be finite for 
non-integer n, e.g. the coincidence limit of the scalar Wightman function G(1)(x, x). I am 
suggesting that dimensional regularization be treated not just as a mathematical trick for 
the purpose of renormalization, but taken seriously as an actual description of a world 
with n ≠ 3. One may then entertain the possibility of anthropic selection of n in some 
interval 3–ε < n < 3 +ε, where ε << 1. One anthropic selection criterion is that the vacuum 
energy should be small enough to permit galaxy formation (Weinberg, 1987). 
To illustrate this idea with a toy model, consider the energy density of a scalar field of 
mass m in n-dimensional de Sitter space (Birrell and Davies, 1982), where now I use n 
for the total number of spacetime dimensions. Because the quantum vacuum energy 
density is subject to renormalization ambiguities, the calculation can proceed only by 
making a further ansatz. To that end, I postulate that the non-zero measured value of dark 
energy represents the vacuum expectation value of the field produced by the (small) 
departure from n = 4. 
In de Sitter space, the stress-energy-momentum tensor is given on symmetry grounds 
by 
<Tμν> = ½m2gμνG(1)(x,x)/n.       (1) 
 
Dowker and Critchley (1976) derived the following expression for the coincidence limit 
of the Wightman function: 
 
G(1)(x,x) = 2α2/(4πα2)n/2Γ[ν(n)–½+n/2]Γ[–ν(n)–½+n/2] 
× Γ(1–n/2)Γ–1[½+ν(n)] Γ–1[½–ν(n)]      (2) 
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where α is the radius of de Sitter space and 
 
[ν(n)]2 = ¼(n – 1)2 – m2α2 – ξn(n – 1),     (3) 
 
ξ being the usual conformal coupling parameter. The right hand side of Eq. (2) is finite 
for n ≠ 4 but divergent at n = 4. One may expand the expression around n = 4 to display 
the incipiently divergent terms: 
 
G(1)(x,x) ≈  2mn–4(4π)–n/2{m2Γ(1– n/2) – (ξ –1/6)n(n –1)α–2Γ(2 – n/2)}  
+ finite correction.        (4) 
 
 
The finite correction is given in Birrell and Davies (1982), p. 192, and, in the assumed 
limit mα >> 1, it is exceedingly small compared to the measured value of dark energy. 
Hence I shall not consider it explicitly here. Rather, I concentrate on the incipiently 
divergent terms. Because of the symmetry of de Sitter space, all the terms in Eq. (1) 
arising from Eq. (4) have the effect of renormalizing the dark energy (i.e. cosmological 
constant). Hence, as explained, we may proceed only by making an assumption about the 
bare value of the vacuum energy. To be consistent with my ansatz that the non-zero 
measured value of the dark energy is produced by the departure of n from 4, it is 
necessary to assume a bare value that cancels the leading term in (4). This could be 
justified either by an appeal to supersymmetry, or by noting that the leading term survives 
even in the Minkowski space limit α = ∞, and so must vanish on grounds of self-
consistency. (Note, incidentally, that all the incipiently divergent terms vanish in the 
massless limit away from n = 4.)  The next term, when substituted into Eq. (1), yields a 
vacuum energy of 
 
– (1/16π2ε)(m2/α2),        (5) 
 
where I have assumed minimal coupling ξ = 0 and expanded the gamma function about n 
= 4 (ε = 0). By hypothesis, this value will be equal to the observed value of the 
cosmological constant, 12/α2. Then 
 
ε = – m2/192π2.        (6) 
 
At this stage we have to make a choice for the mass m. By way of illustration, if we 
choose the Planck mass (= 1 in these units), then ε ≈ –1/2000. If we choose the more 
realistic case of a GUT-scale Higgs scalar, then ε ≈ –10–10. The former is probably too 
large to have escaped detection. The latter case might be observable as a small departure 
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 from the Newtonian inverse square law of gravitation. If the famous Pioneer anomaly 
(Anderson et. al., 2002) is treated as due to this cause (which is implausible, given that it 
seems to be constant), then using the anomalous acceleration of 8.74×10-8 cm s-2 yields a 
dimensional correction of about ε ≈ – 10–17. 
Intriguing though these results may be, they do not permit anthropic selection as they 
stand, because Eq. (6) has been derived merely by using self-consistency: I have not 
anywhere had to insert the measured value of the dark energy or impose an upper bound 
for reasons connected with galaxy formation. This may be traced to the way that the 
radius of de Sitter space (i.e. the value of the cosmological constant) has scaled out of the 
answer in this simple calculation. If I were to assume conformal rather than minimal 
coupling, ξ = 1/6, the m2/α2 term would vanish. The leading term then comes from 
expanding to the next power in ε. This term is of order εm4, with m in Planck units. I may 
then invoke the anthropic criterion (i.e. the requirement that galaxy formation is not 
frustrated), which puts an upper limit on the said term about 10–120 (in Planck units), and 
leads to the constraint ε < 10–120m–4. For a GUT-mass Higgs field this becomes ε < 10–100, 
which is disappointingly small from the point of view of possible observational tests. On 
the other hand, if one were to take m to be a proton mass, then ε < 10–34. I must stress, 
however, that the above example is for illustrative purposes only. A more realistic 
calculation of the vacuum energy, with less symmetry than de Sitter space and more 
fields included, might enable interesting and observationally testable bounds to be placed 
on space dimensionality. 
 
3. Physical law and the computational capacity of the universe 
 
The founding dualism of physical science is the distinctive conceptual separation of 
laws on the one hand and states on the other. This is encapsulated by assumption I in my 
list. The orthodox view of physical laws is that they are transcendent, absolute, eternal 
and immutable, like the axioms of geometry. They are often envisaged as inhabiting a 
non-physical Platonic realm of idealized mathematical forms (Penrose, 2004). Frequent 
use is made, for example, of such idealizations as real and complex numbers and 
differentiable manifolds. By contrast, states of the world are time-dependent and 
contingent. So, according to traditional wisdom, there is a strong asymmetry: the laws 
affect how the states evolve, but the states have no effect whatsoever on the laws. 
The orthodox view of the nature of physical law is, however, being increasingly 
challenged by the application of high energy physics to the very early universe. Physicists 
now recognize that certain features of low energy physics that previously were 
considered the product of fundamental laws might actually be frozen accidents, 
contingently dependent on the manner in which certain symmetries were spontaneously 
broken as the universe cooled from an ultra-hot initial phase. For example, the 20 odd 
unfixed parameters of the standard model of particle physics might not all derive 
ultimately from some underlying unified theory such as string/M theory, but might 
instead emerge with arbitrary values acquired by symmetry breaking at the Planck or 
GUT scale (see, for example, Tegmark et. al, 2006). Furthermore, what we had 
previously taken to be fundamental laws of physics might in some cases turn out to be 
only low-energy effective laws – or by-laws, to use Martin Rees’s expression (Livio and 
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 Rees, 2005) – with a form contingent on the specific state (or vacuum sector) pertaining 
to our particular cosmic region (or to our particular member universe contained within a 
multiverse). According to this picture, the form of the laws and the values of some of 
their parameters are dependant on the states. Thus laws and states evolve together during 
the very early universe, and the separation of laws and states into conceptually disjoint 
classes is an emergent phenomenon, a frozen relic from the melting pot of the primordial 
universe. 
The recognition that some familiar laws and physical parameters may not in fact enjoy 
an absolute transcendent ontological status, rather, that laws and states might co-evolve, 
remains strongly circumscribed in these theories, however. The low-energy effective laws 
are deemed to stem, ultimately, from a set of unexplained truly fundamental laws that 
retain the traditional Platonic form. In string theory, for example, there may exist a 
variegated landscape of solutions, but the landscape itself is defined via the string theory 
Lagrangian (or, through some duality relationship, in terms of an equivalent object), 
which entails the aforementioned mathematical idealizations (e.g. real numbers). 
Similarly, the universe-generating mechanism required to populate the landscape and 
create a multiverse depends on quantum mechanics, bubble nucleation, tunnelling, dark 
energy, inflation according to general relativity, etc., the principles governing all of 
which must be assumed to enjoy an independent and unexplained Platonic existence. 
The history of physics, from Ptolemy onwards, can be cast as the progressive 
replacement of seemingly fundamental laws by initial conditions, environmental 
circumstances, selection effects or effective laws (Tegmark et. al., 2006). It is tempting to 
consider the logical culmination of this process, in which there are no fundamental laws 
at all in the traditional Platonic sense. There is some precedent in this speculation. John 
Wheeler’s doctrine of “mutability” and “law without law” denied the existence of any 
transcendent idealized physical laws. Wheeler sought an explanation for the universe in 
which law and cosmos somehow co-emerged from the big bang (Wheeler, 1983). The 
concept of transcendent immutable laws have also been attacked by anti-reductionsists. 
Robert Laughlin argues (Laughlin, 2005) that traditional “fundamental” laws are a myth, 
and that the appearance of “lower-level” microcosmic laws arises from certain emergent 
organizing principles that govern the way in which observers interact with the world. 
“Reliable cause-and-effect relationships in the natural world,” he writes (Laughlin, 2005), 
“owe this reliability to principles of organization rather than microscopic rules… The 
distinction between fundamental laws and the laws descending from them [secondary 
laws] is a myth – and so is therefore the idea of mastery of the universe through 
mathematics solely.” 
Another critic of idealized Platonic laws was Rolf Landauer, who worked at the 
interface of physics and computation. Landauer derived his world view from Wheeler’s 
“It from bit dictum,” declaring that “computation is physical!” Landauer believed, in 
other words, that physical laws make sense as mathematical operations only when those 
operations can, at least in principle, be implemented in the real universe, with its finite 
resources (Landauer, 1967): 
“The calculative process, just like the measurement process, is subject to some 
limitations.  A sensible theory of physics must respect these limitations, and should not 
invoke calculative routines that in fact cannot be carried out.” 
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 Landauer’s position introduces a fundamental ambiguity into physical law, quite 
distinct from quantum uncertainty (Landauer, 1986). If we consider a dynamical law to 
be an algorithm for mapping input bit strings into output bit strings, then this operation is 
restricted by the finite computational capacity of the universe. The universe is 
computationally bounded because of its finite age and the existence of a particle horizon. 
This limits the number of degrees of freedom that can be in causal contact at any 
particular epoch. In addition, quantum mechanics sets a limit on the speed with which 
information may be processed by a physical transition, e.g. a spin flip. The maximum rate 
of elementary operations is 2E/πħ, a limit which would be attained by an ideal quantum 
computer (Margolus and Levitin, 1998). 
A third fundamental limit arises because information must either be stored or erased in 
a finite number of physical degrees of freedom, which imposes a thermodynamic bound 
(Lloyd, 2000). A convenient way to display this is by combining it with the first two 
limits in the form of the Bekenstein bound (Bekenstein, 1981): 
 
kER/ħcS ≥ 1/2π         (7) 
 
where k is Boltzmann’s constant, R is the size of the system (assumed spherical) and S is 
its entropy. The limit (7) is saturated for the case the case of a black hole, which may be 
regarded as a perfect information processing (or erasing) system. The information content 
of the system is related to the entropy S by the Shannon formula: 
 
S = k ln2.          (8) 
 
It is straightforward to apply the foregoing limits to a horizon volume within the 
expanding universe (Lloyd, 2002). The total number of bits available within that volume 
(“the observable universe”) at the current epoch is calculated to be ~ 10120 if gravitational 
degrees of freedom are included in addition to all particles of matter. One may also 
readily calculate the maximum total number of information processing operations that 
can possibly have taken place since the origin of the universe within an expanding 
horizon volume. Note that the cosmological scale factor grows like t½ initially, whereas 
the horizon radius grows like t. Therefore a horizon volume will have encompassed fewer 
particles in the past. Taking this into account, one arrives at an upper bound for the total 
number of bits of information that have been processed by all the matter in the universe 
that is also ~ 10120 (Lloyd, 2002). In accordance with Landauer’s philosophy, the 
enormous but nevertheless finite number 10120 sets a limit to the fidelity of any in-
principle application of deterministic physical laws. 
It should be stressed that this limit is time-dependent: as the universe ages, the horizon 
volume ~ (ct)3 increases, and with it the effective information capacity of the universe. If 
one therefore adopts the Landauer-Wheeler philosophy concerning the nature of physical 
law, then what are traditionally taken to be absolute, infinitely-precise, immutable laws of 
physics become replaced by quasi-laws that “congeal” from fuzzy, ambiguous origins in 
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 a continuous and specifiable manner as the universe evolves from its dense initial state. In 
this manner it is possible to give concrete expression to Wheeler’s otherwise rather vague 
notion of “law without law.” 
The recent discovery of dark energy implies the presence of a second horizon – a de 
Sitter event horizon, in the simplest case that the dark energy density is constant. The 
entropy of the de Sitter horizon is given by 
 
SdeS = k×(horizon area)/(Planck area) = 3kc5/8G2ħρ    (9) 
 
where ρ is the density of dark energy, measured to be about 7×10-30 gm cm-3 ≈ (10-3 eV)4.  
If the Shannon formula (8) is applied to the de Sitter horizon, it implies an associated 
information ~ 10122 bits. The fact that this number is close to the current information 
content of the universe is basically the same as the coincidence that, to within a factor of 
order unity, we find ourselves living at the epoch at which dark energy starts to dominate 
over matter. 
Note that if the dark energy density satisfied an equation of state with pressure p < –ρ, 
then ρ would rise inexorably towards a “big rip” singularity at a finite time in the future 
(Davies, 1988; Caldwell et. al., 2003). During the approach to the singularity the event 
horizon area contracts (Davies, 1988), which implies that the Landauer limit would 
decline. The implications of the big rip scenario for the Landauer-Wheeler notion of 
physical law are intriguing. The laws of physics emerge continuously from the big bang, 
growing more and more precise with time and converging on their observed form. Then, 
after some billions of years, when the effects of dark energy predominate, the laws start 
to “slacken” again, growing less and less precise as the big rip approaches, until they fade 
away altogether just prior to the final singularity. (In sketching this rough picture I am 
ignoring the “back reaction” of the fuzziness in the laws on the cosmological dynamics. 
In a fully worked out theory one would have to solve the cosmological model self-
consistently.) 
Returning to the simpler case of constant dark energy, there is strong evidence (e.g. 
Bousso, 2002; Davies and Davis, 2003) that the de Sitter horizon entropy given by Eq. 
(9) constitutes an absolute upper bound to the information content of a universe 
dominated by dark energy of constant energy density (i.e. a cosmological constant). This 
property has been formally enshrined in the so called holographic principle (‘t Hooft, 
1993, Susskind, 1995), according to which the total information content of a simply-
connected region of space is captured by the two-dimensional surface that bounds it, after 
the fashion of a hologram. The maximum information content of a region is given by this 
surface area divided by the Planck area, which is considered to provide a fundamental 
finite cell size for space. The de Sitter horizon, which is the end state of cosmological 
evolution in those models for which dark energy (of constant energy density) eventually 
dominates, saturates the holographic bound, and so sets an upper limit on the information 
capacity of the universe throughout its entire evolutionary history. Thus, taking the 
astronomical observations at face value, it would appear that the universe never 
contained, and never will contain, more than about 10122 bits of information, although the 
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 number of bits processed up to a given epoch will continue to rise with time. Such a rise 
will not continue indefinitely, however. The holographic bound implies that the universe 
is a finite state system, and so it will visit and re-visit all possible states (i.e. undergo 
Poincaré cycles) over a stupendous length of time (Goheer et. al., 2003). 
It has been suggested (Susskind, 1995) that the holographic principle should be 
regarded as one of the founding principles of physical science. Combining the 
holographic principle with the Landauer-Wheeler point of view leads inexorably to the 
causal openness of systems exceeding a certain threshold of complexity. As I shall point 
out in the following section, the implications of this openness for the nature of physical 
law and the problem of “what exists” are profound. 
 
4. Room at the bottom for strong emergence 
 
The term emergence is used to describe the appearance of new properties that arise 
when a system exceeds a certain level of size or complexity, properties that are absent 
from the constituents of the system. It is a concept often summed up by the phrase that 
“the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” Life is often cited as an example of an 
emergent phenomenon: no atoms of my body are living, yet I am living (see, for example, 
Morowitz, 2002). Biological organisms depend on the processes of their constituent parts, 
yet they nevertheless exhibit a degree of autonomy from their parts (see, for example, 
Kauffman, 2000). How can this be? These seem to be contradictory properties. 
Philosophers distinguish between weak and strong forms of emergence (Bedau, 1997, 
2002). A weakly emergent system is one in which the causal dynamics of the whole is 
completely determined by the causal dynamics of its parts (together with information 
about boundary conditions and the intrusion of any external disturbances), but for which 
the complete and detailed behaviour could not be predicted without effectively 
performing a one-to-one simulation. So a weakly emergent system is one that has no 
explanatory “short cuts” or abbreviated descriptions, and is therefore algorithmically 
incompressible in the Kolmogorov-Chaitin sense (Chaitin, 1987). The fastest simulator of 
the system is the system’s own dynamics. 
A strongly emergent system is one in which higher levels of complexity possess 
genuine causal powers that are absent from the constituent parts. That is, wholes may 
exhibit properties and principles that cannot be reduced, even in principle, to the 
cumulative effect of the properties and laws of the components. A corollary of strong 
emergence is the presumption of “downward causation” (Campbell, 1974, Bedau, 2002) 
in which wholes have causal efficacy over parts. Strong emergence is a much more 
contentious topic, although there have been many distinguished physicists prepared to 
argue for some form of it, including founders of quantum mechanics such as Bohr (1933), 
Schrödinger (1944) and Wigner (1961), as well as prominent philosophers like Broad 
(1925) and Popper (Popper and Eccles, 1977). These strong emergentists do not claim 
that additional “organizing principles” over-ride the underlying laws of physics, merely 
that they complement them. Emergent laws, they claim, may be consistent with, but not 
reducible to, the normal laws of physics operating at the microscopic level. 
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 But is this claim correct? Strong emergence is often dismissed as inconsistent with the 
causal properties of the micro-world (Kim, 1993). The normal laws of physics operating 
at the micro-level are said to be sufficient to completely determine the behaviour of the 
system, i.e. to causally saturate it, so they leave “no room at the bottom” for additional 
organizing principles to gain causal purchase on the parts. This is, in effect, a no-go 
theorem for strong emergence and downward causation. 
An easy way to understand the basis of this obstacle is to adopt an operational 
distinction between weak and strong emergence, which is whether or not a complete 
microscopic account of a complex system that displays emergent properties is possible in 
principle, notwithstanding its mathematical complexity. If it is, then the system may be 
said to exhibit only weak emergence. This operation criterion may be cast in the language 
of Laplace’s demon. Laplace pointed out that the states of a closed deterministic system, 
such as a finite collection of particles subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics, are 
completely fixed once the initial conditions are specified (Laplace, 1825): 
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause 
of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that animate 
nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were vast 
enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement 
of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect 
nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its 
eyes.” 
A strongly emergent system may be defined as one that resists prediction even by 
Laplace’s omniscient demon. It is this form of predictive emergentism that is affected by 
the Landauer-Wheeler concept of physical law when applied to a universe of finite 
computational power. Laplace described his calculating demon as possessing an intellect 
“vast enough to submit the data to analysis…” A demon inhabiting an idealized Platonic 
realm could indeed be “vast enough.” But adopting Landauer’s view of the nature of 
physical law changes things significantly, because the demon is now obliged to get by 
with the limited computational resources of the real universe. Something that could not 
be calculated within the real universe cannot, according to that view, be regarded as a 
legitimate application of physical law. 
There are indeed cosmological models for which no limits exist on the information 
content and processing power of the universe. However, recent observations favour 
cosmological models in which there are fundamental upper bounds on both the 
information content and the processing rate. A Landauer-Laplacian demon associated 
with such a cosmological model would perforce inherit these limitations, and thus the 
fundamental fuzziness or ambiguity in the nature of physical law associated with these 
limitations will translate into a bound on the predictability of complex physical systems, 
even in principle, if one adopts the Landauer-Wheeler notion of physical law. 
It is of interest to determine just how complex a physical system has to be to encounter 
the Lloyd limit. For most purposes in physical science the limit is too weak to make a jot 
of difference. But in cases where the parameters of the system are combinatorically 
explosive, the limit can be significant. For example, proteins are made of strings of 20 
different sorts of amino acids, and the combinatoric possibility space has more 
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 dimensions than the Lloyd limit of 10120 when the number of amino acids is greater than 
about 60 (Davies, 2004). Curiously, 60 amino acids is about the size of the smallest 
functional protein, suggesting that the threshold for life might correspond to the threshold 
for strong emergence, supporting the contention that life is an emergent phenomenon (in 
the strong sense of emergence). Another example concerns quantum entanglement. An 
entangled state of about 400 particles also approaches the Landauer-Lloyd complexity 
limit (Davies, 2005a). That means the Hilbert space of such a state has more dimensions 
than the informational capacity of the universe; the state simply cannot be specified 
within the real universe. (There are not enough degrees of freedom in the entire cosmos 
to accommodate all the coefficients!) A direct implication of this result is the prediction 
that a quantum computer with more than about 400 entangled components will not 
function as advertised (and 400 is well within the target design specifications of the 
quantum computer industry).  
The take home message of this digression into an alternative ontology for physical law 
is that, in the context of a multiverse, there is no reason whatsoever to limit the 
classification of universes to traditional laws of the idealized Platonic sort. One may also 
contemplate universes labeled by a limitless number of emergent laws or organizing 
principles. This carries clear and sweeping implications for anthropic selection and fine-
tuning. In most discussions of matters anthropic, the link between the laws of physics and 
the emergence of observers is tenuous to say the least, often hinging on little more than 
the formation of carbon. But the sort of organizing principles I have been discussing in 
this section, such as the emergence of new properties in bio-molecules of sufficient 
complexity, have a direct bearing on the formation of life. (They may also have a direct 
bearing on the emergence of consciousness, in neural systems sufficiently complex to 
permit higher-level “mental” organizing principles.) With sufficient understanding of the 
nature of such organizing principles, it would be possible to make a much tighter 
anthropic selection argument than with “orthodox” multiverse models. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
Once one embarks on the slippery multiverse slope, it is unclear just how far from the 
familiar universe we observe one must be prepared to go in considering members of an 
all-embracing ensemble. The “standard” multiverse model based on the string theory 
landscape and eternal inflation, its 10500 instantiations notwithstanding, is actually highly 
restrictive, containing a long list of prerequisites, all of which could be challenged or 
relaxed in a generalized version of the multiverse. I have considered in a speculative vein 
some possible generalizations – alternatives to quantum mechanics, departures from 
integer space dimensionality and non-Platonic laws of physics – and asked whether there 
exist any anthropic constraints on these generalizations. The ultimate goal of this agenda 
is either to discover anthropic explanations for the list of prerequisites A – K, or to 
establish which of these prerequisites is not necessary for life and observers, and which 
might therefore require a deeper level of explanation. 
Tegmark has suggested a total multiverse in which “anything goes.” However, his 
extreme position has few advocates. Moreover, it is not without its own problems. For a 
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 start, there is no compelling reason to classify universes by their mathematical properties. 
One might just as well postulate the set of all aesthetically appealing universes, the set of 
all virtual realities, the set of all emotional experiences, the set of all morally good 
actions, etc. Secondly, there is the problem that the set of all sets is not itself a set (recall 
Russell’s paradox), so that the classification and simplicity criteria are not in fact well 
defined. 
But the alternative is equally problematic. If we accept that less-than-everything exists, 
i.e. that boundary B of Fig. 1 remains, then there must be a selection criterion that divides 
that which exists from that which is merely possible but non-existent. We may thus 
separate universes into two sets: those that really exist and those that could have existed 
but in fact do not. The former set consists of universes that are both logically possible and 
physically instantiated, the latter consists of universes that are mere contenders for reality 
but do not actually exist. We may then ask where the all-important selection rule comes 
from, and why that rule applies rather than some other. Stephen Hawking has addressed 
this issue and expressed it poetically: “Something must breathe fire into the equations,” 
he says, to promote a merely-possible but non-existent universe into the Real Thing 
(Hawking, 1988). What is this fire? Who or what breathes it? Who or what gets to choose 
what exists and what doesn’t? Thus, in all but the most extreme versions of a multiverse 
theory (i.e. super-Tegmark sets of all possible universes of all possible categorization 
qualities), we are still left with the fundamental problem of existence: the mysterious 
process whereby the existent is divided from the possible-but-nonexistent. Clearly, 
invoking a multiverse does not solve that problem: it merely shifts it up one level from 
the realm of universes to the realm of selection rules. The resulting meta-problem – 
which equations are “fired up” and which remain “un-ignited” – would seem to be at least 
as hard as the problem in pre-multiverse days of explaining why a single, unique universe 
exists. 
The problem of “what exists” takes on a different complexion if one relinquishes an 
excessively Platonic view of physical law. In sections 3 and 4 I described a possible 
scenario to express Wheeler’s “law without law” concept, in which the laws of physics 
emerge from the ferment of the cosmic origin gradually over time, steadily “congealing” 
onto excellent but still imperfect approximations to their idealized textbook forms. Using 
the imagery of Fig. 1, the boundaries A and B start out fuzzy and indistinct, but firm up 
over time. The inherent ambiguity implied by this ontology means that the problem of 
what exists is not well-posed. That opens the way to a richer description of nature in 
which there is room for a hierarchy of laws at various levels of complexity, and in which 
the ancient dualism between laws and states becomes blurred. 
Ultimately the problem of what exists cannot be solved within this framework. Needed 
is an additional criterion, such as Leibniz’s optimization principle or Wheeler’s self-
consistent closed circuit of meaning, which he describes as “a self-referential deductive 
axiomatic system” (Wheeler, 1989, p. 357). A discussion of these topics will be given 
elsewhere (Davies 2006). 
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Fig. 1 
The set of all possible worlds contains as a subset the set of all actually-existing worlds, 
which in turn contains as a subset the observed world. Boundary A may be determined by 
applying the weak anthropic principle, but boundary B is immune to anthropic reasoning, 
and requires an additional principle to determine it. 
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